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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:47 pm
Time: 11:47 pm
Results for prison conditions (texas)
2 results foundAuthor: Texans for Public Justice Title: Lax Oversight Plagues Private Prisons in Texas Summary: This report discusses prison privatization in the state of Texas, including the disastrous contract with the Geo Group to run a youth detention facility in West Texas, where state officials abruptly shuttered the Coke County Juvenile Justice Center, after discovering its squalid conditions. Details: Austin, TX: Texans for Public Justice; Grassroots Leadership, 2008. 9p. Source: Watch Your Assets, Vol. 1, No. 9: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2012 at http://info.tpj.org/watchyourassets/prisons/prisons.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://info.tpj.org/watchyourassets/prisons/prisons.pdf Shelf Number: 126502 Keywords: Correctional Administration (Texas)Juvenile Detention (Texas)Prison Conditions (Texas)Private Prisons (Texas) |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007 Awarded to Reeves County, Texas to Operate theReeves County Detention Center I/II Pecos, Texas Summary: In January 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded Contract No. DJB1PC007 to Reeves County, Texas (Reeves County) to operate the Reeves County Detention Center compounds R1 and R2 (RCDC I/II). The purpose of this service contract is to house up to 2,407 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult males. The contract has a 4-year base period with three 2-year option periods, an estimated value of $493 million, and is the Department's second largest contract in terms of total dollars obligated since fiscal year 2014, according to the Federal Procurement Data System. In early 2015, the BOP exercised the contract's third and final option period to extend performance through January 2017. Reeves County subcontracted management of RCDC I/II to The GEO Group, Inc. (the GEO Group), a Florida-based corporation. Reeves County also subcontracted with Correct Care Solutions, LLC (CCS), a Tennessee-based company, to provide comprehensive healthcare services to RCDC I/II inmates.1 The BOP conducts monitoring and oversight of RCDC I/II operations and is responsible for examining all areas of the contract including health services, education, recreation, food service, correctional services, correctional programs, safety, inmate services, and any other area in which inmates voice concerns during interactions with BOP staff. In January 2009, there was an inmate riot at RCDC I/II.2 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to assess BOP and RCDC I/II compliance with contract terms and conditions in the areas of billings and payments, staffing requirements, and contract oversight and monitoring. We found that Reeves County and CCS failed to comply with provisions of the Service Contract Act of 1965 (Service Contract Act). As a result, we identified almost $3 million that we either questioned as unallowable or unsupported, or believe should be put to better use.3 Specifically, we found that Reeves County improperly requested and the BOP improperly paid $1.95 million in fringe benefits it was not entitled to receive, including $175,436 in payroll taxes and workers' compensation insurance that were incorrectly calculated. Additionally, CCS requested and the BOP paid $74,765 in fringe benefits that were not properly supported with payroll documentation. Also, we identified and CCS acknowledged fringe benefit underpayments covering 12 current and former CCS employees totaling $22,628. Upon learning about our finding and quantifying these errors, CCS sent reimbursement checks to the 12 current and former CCS employees for the fringe benefit underpayments. Some of the aforementioned unallowable reimbursements have a compounding effect over time because they are incorporated into each monthly invoice until the contract ends. We therefore found that, in addition to remedying the unallowable reimbursements it has already made, the BOP should reduce the contract's monthly price by $41,088 to ensure the contractor will not improperly charge BOP an additional $945,024 should the contract continue through its final month in January 2017. We concluded that these errors were not identified previously because the BOP and the contractors did not have an accurate understanding of certain fundamental requirements of the Service Contract Act. We further found that, between February 2007 and December 2014, RCDC I/II was rated "deficient" or "unsatisfactory" in 6 of 12 award fee evaluation periods.4 BOP's award fee rating reports reflected that RCDC I/II consistently struggled to meet or exceed baseline contractual standards, received an unacceptable number of deficiencies and notices of concern; was unresponsive to BOP inquiries; struggled with staffing issues in health services and correctional services; and frequently submitted inaccurate routine paperwork, including erroneous disciplinary hearing records and monthly invoices. In addition, the BOP reports repeatedly described RCDC I/II's quality control program as minimally or marginally effective. BOP reports indicate that performance improved over time, particularly in 2013 when the contractor received a "good" rating and its first award fee, and in 2014 when the contractor received a "very good" rating and its second award fee. Regarding staffing, we found that during this contract's solicitation process, the BOP requested contractors to submit two offers, one of which eliminated minimum staffing requirements, such as maintaining staffing levels up to 90 percent for correctional services, 85 percent for health services, and 85 percent for all other departments of the BOP approved staffing plan. BOP officials told us they removed these staffing requirements to achieve cost savings and grant the contractor flexibility and discretion to manage the staffing of the facility. As a result, from the start of the contract to March 2009 there were no minimum staffing requirements for the facility. During that time, we found that the number of Correctional Officers was significantly below the 90 percent threshold that was later reincorporated into the contract after the inmate riot in January 2009. Using Staffing Report and Wage Determination information, we found that from April 2007 to March 2009, Reeves County would have spent an additional $4.67 million in order to fill enough Correctional Officer positions to meet the Staffing Plan thresholds that were later reincorporated in the contract after the January 2009 riot. According to an After-Action Report prepared by BOP officials following the January 2009 riot, the BOP noted that while low staffing levels alone were not the direct cause of the disturbances, they directly affected Security and Health Services functions. Following the inmate riot, the BOP reinstated the minimum staffing requirements into the contract, resulting in significantly increased staff at RCDC I/II, including Correctional Officer staffing that has typically been above the 90 percent threshold since the contract change.We found that RCDC I/II has also had significant issues staffing its health services unit. In December 2010, the BOP added to all contracts with privately managed correctional facilities a requirement that the contractor staff its health services unit so that staffing levels equaled or exceeded 85 percent of the contract requirement. However, from December 2010 through December 2013, a period spanning 37 months, RCDC I/II failed to meet the 85 percent threshold in 34 of the 37 months. After we expressed our concerns with these staffing issues, CCS began a concerted effort to adequately staff RCDC I/II and has exceeded the 85 percent threshold from September 2014 through February 2015. Because RCDC I/II consistently failed to achieve the 85 percent staffing requirement from December 2010 through December 2013, its vacant health services positions became subject to invoice deductions. Specifically, the Federal Acquisition Regulation authorizes the BOP to address non-compliant staffing by reducing the contract price to reflect the "reduced value of the services performed." However, the BOP calculated the reduced value of the services performed based on the minimum pay rates required by Department of Labor (DOL) issued wage determinations instead of the higher market value salaries that CCS had been paying its health services personnel, resulting in smaller invoice deductions. For one personnel category, licensed vocational nurses, we estimated that CCS would have had to pay $314,856 more in total compensation from 2011-2013, had the BOP continued to use actual rates as the basis for deductions instead of the lesser DOL rate. Given RCDC I/II's past issues with staffing its health services unit and the differences between the aforementioned deduction methods, we believe that BOP's use of the DOL rate as a deduction basis creates a potential financial incentive for CCS to accept less costly monthly vacancy deductions rather than filling costlier positions at market rates. Our audit also assessed RCDC I/II's quality control program. We found that this program, which had been minimally or marginally effective, improved over time and BOP onsite staff generally provided comprehensive monitoring and oversight. However, we identified areas for continued improvement. Specifically, RCDC I/II needs to retain original quality control-related documentation as required by the contract, fully document monitoring activities, and complete corrective action plans for significant deficiencies. Finally, we found that RCDC I/II officials had converted a general population housing unit into a "modified monitoring unit" referred to as the "J-Unit." The purpose of the J-Unit was to isolate from the rest of the compound's population inmates found to be coercing other inmates to join demonstrations, and whose behavior was creating institutional security problems capable of jeopardizing the safety of RCDC I/II staff and inmates. J-Unit inmates have more restricted movement and less access to institutional services than general population inmates. The OIG's review of the J-Unit determined that RCDC I/II lacked specific policies and procedures that addressed important aspects of the J-Unit's operations, such as (1) guidance on what evidence is necessary to place an inmate into the J-Unit; (2) procedures to ensure inmates receive due process with respect to placement in J-Unit, including the ability to challenge their placement in the J-Unit and the steps necessary to re-designate inmates to an unrestricted general population unit; (3) monitoring or oversight mechanisms to ensure the J-Unit is used as intended; and (4) safeguards to ensure inmate rights are consistent, to the maximum extent possible in light of security concerns, with inmates in other general population housing. This report makes 18 recommendations to assist BOP in improving contractor and subcontractor operations and BOP monitoring and oversight at RCDC I/II under Contract No. DJB1PC007, and in addressing the almost $3 million identified as questioned costs and funds that should be put to better use. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2015. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 15-15: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2015/a1515.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2015/a1515.pdf Shelf Number: 135430 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal PrisonsPrison AdministrationPrison Conditions (Texas) |